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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case arrives on appeal from the Honorable George A. Southworth's decision
granting summary judgment to the Plaintiff, the Nampa Highway District No. 1 ("NHD"). NHD
filed a declaratory judgment action against the Defendants seeking the court to quiet title to a
certain 33-foot wide strip ofland, commonly known as the south half ofW. Orchard Avenue in
Canyon County, Idaho, and further seeking the court to decree that NHD holds fee simple title to
the 33-foot strip.
The basis for NHD's claim of fee simple ownership of the 33-foot wide strip ofland is a
deed ofright-of-way dated August 4, 1941, executed by J. G. and Ora Lupton (collectively, the
"Luptons") in favor ofNHD. The deed of right-of-way was recorded with the Canyon County,
Idaho Recorder's Office on February 21, 1989, as instrument no. 8903057 (the "Deed ofRightof-Way").1 The 33-foot wide strip ofland is a 2,640-foot long and 33-foot wide rectangular
shaped parcel, the northern border of which is on the approximate centerline of W. Orchard Ave.
and the southern border of which is 33-feet to the south of the centerline (the "33-Foot Strip"). 2
Defendants Brian Knight and Lisa Knight (collectively, the "Knights") purchased their
property on July 10, 1998, and the legal description in the Knights' deed includes that portion of
the 33-Foot Strip adjacent to the Knight property (the "Knight Deed Property"). 3
Defendant, Manuel Dominguez purchased his property on December 11, 2004, and, like
the Knight deed, the legal description in the Manual Dominguez deed includes that portion of the
33-Foot Strip adjacent to the Dominguez property (the "Dominguez Deed Property"). 4

1
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3
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2

pp.
pp.
pp.
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279-280
269 (paragraph 8), and 279-280
269 (paragraph 9), 320, and 338
270 (paragraph 10), 321, and 338

1

Both the Knights and Manual Dominguez acknowledge they are not bona fide purchasers
who took free ofNHD's ownership interest in the 33-Foot Strip because they acquired their
properties after the recording of the Deed ofRight-of-Way5. Rather, the Knights and Manual
Dominguez, and their lenders, defended the lawsuit on the basis of the "shelter rule". The
Defendants asserted that prior owners of the Knight Deed Property and the Dominguez Deed
Property were bona fide purchasers who acquired the 33-Foot Strip free and clear ofNHD's
unrecorded ownership interest, and that the "shelter rule" protects Defendants even though they
are not themselves bona fide purchasers.
For the "shelter rule" to apply, Defendants must prove a prior owner was a bona fide
purchaser. But Defendants submitted no affidavits, declarations, or other evidence to establish
any prior owners were bona fide purchasers.
Although the burden of proof lies with Defendants to establish the elements of the
"shelter rule" defense, NHD nevertheless submitted evidence through the affidavit of Eric
Shannon that W. Orchard Ave. is a section line county road, including that portion of the road
adjacent to or overlapping the Knight Deed Property and the Dominguez Deed Property. The
road has been used and maintained as a public highway since at least 1921. 6 Thus, NHD has
been in physical possession of W. Orchard Avenue since 1921 and so the prior owners of the
Knight Deed Property and Dominguez Deed Property had actual or constructive notice that NHD
had ownership of a portion of the Knight Deed Property and Dominguez Deed Property. Those
prior owners had a duty to inquire and investigate in order to be bona fide purchasers.

5
6

R., p. 496
R., pp. 325-327, and 495

2

Defendants did not submit any evidence rebutting the existence and use of W. Orchard
Ave. since 1921. Rather, Defendants submitted affidavits from Mr. Knight7 and Mr. Dominguez 8
stating the paved width of W. Orchard Ave. was 22-feet wide, or 11-feet wide on the south side
ofW. Orchard Ave. Defendants then asserted that any notice the prior owners of the Knight
Deed Property and Dominguez Deed Property had was limited to the paved 11-feet and did not
include the entire 33-Foot Strip9 , and the prior owners were bona fide purchasers of all property
outside the 11 feet.
Defendants' argument fails for multiple reasons. First, Defendants submitted no evidence
as to what actual knowledge or notice the prior owners did or did not have. Second, NHD's
possession and use of W. Orchard Ave. is by law deemed actual or constructive notice to a
subsequent purchaser ofNHD's claim. Any such subsequent purchaser (i.e. the prior owners of
the Knight Deed Property and Dominguez Deed Property) cannot have purchased the property in
good faith with notice of this inconsistent claim. 10 Again, Defendants submitted no evidence as
to what inquiries or investigations the prior owners did or did not make.
Third, pursuant to Idaho Code §39-601 (1933), §40-701 (1966), and § 12-2312 (1985)
entitled "Width of Highways", and as confirmed by the court in Halverson vs. N Latah Highway

District, 151 Idaho 196, 207, 254 P.3d 497, 508 (2011), all public highways in Idaho are a
minimum width of fifty (50) feet wide unless (i) otherwise stated in an applicable deed, plat
dedication, other document, etc., or (ii) a bridge, alley, or in a townsite or city. Thus, the
Defendants' assertion that the prior owners were only on notice of an 11-foot wide paved portion

7

R., p. 406
R., p. 438
9
R., pp. 500-501
10
Langroise vs. Becker, 96 Idaho 218 P.2d 178 (1974); and W. Wood Investments, Inc. vs. Acord, 141 Idaho 75, 86,
106 P.3d 401,412 (2005)
8

3

of the public highway is belied by the law that NHD' s ownership claim on the Knight Deed
Property and the Dominguez Deed Property was 25 feet or more.
Finally, NHD asked the court to interpret the Deed of Right-of-Way and decree whether
the deed conveyed to NHD fee simple title, or some lesser title. The Honorable George A.
Southworth decreed the Deed of Right-of-Way conveyed fee simple title to NHD. 11 Defendants
did not brief or argue this issue to the trial court, and did not specifically identify this issue in any
notice of appeal, and so have waived this issue on appeal.

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
W. Orchard Avenue:

1.

W. Orchard Avenue adjacent to or overlapping the Knight Deed Property and the

Dominguez Deed Property is a section line road and has been shown on NHD Maps as Segment
No. 143 since 1921. 12
2.

W. Orchard Avenue adjacent or to or overlapping the Knight Deed Property and

Dominguez Deed Property has been used by the public as a public highway since at least 1921. 13
3.

W. Orchard Avenue adjacent to or overlapping the Knight Deed Property and the

Dominguez Deed Property has been maintained and repaired at public expense continuously since
at least 1921, by NHD or its predecessors in interest. 14
4.

In 1941, NHD discussed improving W. Orchard Ave. and began working to secure

a 66-foot wide right-of-way in order to eventually pave the highway. After an engineer

11

R.,
R.,
13
R.,
14
R.,
12

pp. 502-503
p. 327
p. 327
p. 327

4

established the centerline, NHD asked for right-of-way deeds for 33-feet on each side of the
centerline before making improvements. 15
5.

On August 4, 1941, the Luptons dedicated a 33-foot strip of land to NHD via a

Deed of Right-of-Way. The Deed of Right-of-Way contained a legal description of the parcel
stretching from the centerline ofW. Orchard Ave. onto the Luptons' farm "necessary that a public
highway be laid out and opened for public use." 16
Chain of Title on the Knight Deed Property:

6.

W.A. & Lou Dedman transferred their interest in the Knight Deed Property and

the Dominguez Deed Property to Ora Lupton on or about April 5, 1920, by a deed recorded as
instrument no. 106303, records of Canyon County 17 ;
7.

Ora Lupton then transferred her ownership interest in the 33-Foot Strip of land,

bordering the centerline ofW. Orchard Ave, for both the Knight Deed Property and Dominguez
Deed Property to NHD by a deed (i.e. the Deed of Right-of Way) executed on August 4, 1941,
and recorded on February 21, 1989, as instrument no. 8903057, records of Canyon County 18 ;
8.

The Probate of the Estate of Ora Lupton transferred the Estate's ownership

interest in the Knight Deed Property to James G. Lupton on or about May 10, 1945, by a decree
recorded as instrument no. 298481, records of Canyon County 19 ;
9.

The Probate of the Estate of James G. Lupton transferred the Estate's ownership

interest in the Knight Deed Property to Howard Wayne Lupton and Marvin Carroll Lupton on or

15

R.,
R.,
17
R.,
18
R.,
19
R.,
16

p. 495
p. 495
pp. 269 and 366
pp. 269, 279-280, and 366
pp. 366 and 495

5

about May 18, 1958, by a deed and decree recorded as instrument nos. 457191 and 457276,
records of Canyon County, Idaho, respectively2°;
10.

Marvin Carroll Lupton transferred his ownership interest in the Knight Deed

Property to Howard Wayne Lupton on or about May 21, 1958, by a deed recorded as instrument
no. 457369, records of Canyon County, Idaho 21 ;
11.

Howard Wayne and Maxine Lupton transferred their ownership interest in the

Knight Deed Property to Billy J. and Vonda L. Downs, husband and wife on or about June 21,
1963, by a deed recorded as instrument no. 535645, records of Canyon County, Idaho22 ;
12.

Billy J. and Vonda L. Downs transferred their ownership interest in the Knight

Deed Property to Brian K. and Lisa M. Knight on or about July 9, 1998 (the "Knight Deed"). 23
13.

The Knight Deed conveyed the Knight Deed Property subject to all public rights-

of-way ofrecord. 24

Chain of Title on the Dominguez Deed Property:
14.

W.A. & Lou Dedman transferred their interest in the Knight Deed Property and

the Dominguez Deed Property to Ora Lupton on or about April 5, 1920, by a deed recorded as
instrument no. 106303, records of Canyon County25 ;
15.

Ora Lupton transferred her ownership interest in the 33-Foot Strip ofland,

bordering the centerline ofW. Orchard Ave, for both the Knight Deed Property and Dominguez

20

R.,
R.,
22
R.,
23
R.,
24 Id.
25
R.,
21

pp.
pp.
pp.
pp.

367,
367,
367,
269,

and 380-385
and 386-387
and 388-389
281-282, 366, and 369-370

pp. 269,366,412, and 414
6

Deed Property to NHD by a deed (i.e. the Deed of Right-of Way) executed on August 4, 1941,
and recorded on February 21, 1989, as instrument no. 8903057, records of Canyon County26 ;
16.

The Probate of the Estate of Ora Lupton transferred the Estate's ownership

interest in the Dominguez Deed Property to James G. Lupton on or about May 10, 1945, by a
decree recorded as instrument no. 298481, records of Canyon County27 ;
17.

The Probate of the Estate of James G. Lupton transferred the Estate's ownership

interest in the Dominguez Deed Property to Howard Wayne Lupton and Marvin Carroll Lupton
on or about May 18, 1958, by a deed and decree recorded as instrument nos. 457191 and 457276,
records of Canyon County, Idaho, respectively28 ;
18.

Marvin Carroll Lupton transferred his ownership interest in the Dominguez Deed

Property to Howard Wayne Lupton on or about May 21, 1958, by a deed recorded as instrument
no. 457369, records of Canyon County, Idaho 29 ;
19.

Howard Wayne and Maxine Lupton transferred their ownership interest in the

Dominguez Deed Property to Roy and Judith Beets, husband and wife, on or about August 31,
1983, by deed recorded as instrument no. 985106, records of Canyon County, Idaho 30 ;
20.

Roy and Judith Beets transferred their ownership interest in the Dominguez Deed

Property to Kalvin B. and Julie D. Wilkinson, husband and wife, on or about May 26, 1999, by
deed recorded as instrument no. 9920726, records of Canyon County, Idaho 31 ;

26

R.,
R.,
28
R.,
29
R.,
30
R.,
31
R.,
27

pp.
pp.
pp.
pp.
pp.
pp.

269, 279-280, 366,412, 415-416
366,412, 418-419, and 495
367, 380-385, 412, and 420-425
367, 388-389, 412, 426-427
273, 412, and 428
273, 412, and 429
7

21.

Kalvin B. and Julie D. Wilkinson transferred their ownership interest in the

Dominguez Deed Property to Manuel Dominguez, an unmarried man, on or about January 3,
2005, by a deed recorded as instrument no. 200500135, records of Canyon County, Idaho 32 ;
22.

The deed to Manuel Dominguez conveyed the Dominguez Deed Property subject

to all public right-of-ways of record33 ; and
23.

Manuel Dominguez, an unmarried man, then transferred his ownership interest in

the Dominguez Deed Property to Manuel and Maria Dominguez, husband and wife, on or about
July 24, 2018, by a deed recorded as instrument no. 2018-032388, records of Canyon County,
Idaho. 34
Overlap of Legal Descriptions:

The legal description per the Knight Deed borders on the approximate centerline of W.
Orchard Ave. The 33-Foot Strip ofland conveyed to NHD pursuant to the Deed of Right-of-Way
also borders on the same approximate centerline of W. Orchard Ave. Thus, the overlap of these
two legal descriptions and the property at issue is the 33-Foot Strip of land bordering on the
approximate centerline of W. Orchard Ave. and a point 33 feet south towards or on the Knight
Deed Property. 35
The legal description for the Dominguez Deed Property per the Dominguez Deed borders
on the approximate centerline ofW. Orchard Ave. The 33-Foot Strip ofland conveyed to NHD
pursuant to the Deed of Right-of-Way also borders on the same approximate centerline of W.
Orchard Ave. Thus, the overlap of these two legal descriptions in the property at issue is the 33-

32

R., pp. 270, 283-285, 412, and 430-432
Id.
34
R., pp. 273, 412, and 433-435
35
R., pp. 270-271, 327, and 496
33

8

Foot Strip ofland bordering on the approximate centerline of W. Orchard Ave. and a point 33
feet south towards or on the Dominguez Deed Property. 36
III. RESTATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

1.

Whether the district court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of NHD,

quieting title to the 33-Foot Wide Strip of land in NHD and denying the Defendants' asserted
"shelter rule" defense; and
2.

Whether the district court correctly decreed that NHD is the owner in fee simple of

the 33-Foot Wide Strip ofland commonly referred to as W. Orchard Avenue in Canyon County,
Idaho, as described in the Deed of Right-of-Way.
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

An Idaho appellate court reviewing a ruling on summary judgment employs the same
standard as the district court below. Er/and v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 136 Idaho 131, 133, 30 P.3d
286, 288 (2001). Under Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is proper "if
the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled a judgment
as a matter oflaw." Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c). In order to demonstrate a genuine issue of material
fact, the party opposing the motion must present more than a conclusory assertion that an issue
of fact exists.

Allstate Ins. Co. v. Mocaby, 133 Idaho 593, 596, 990 P.2d 1204, 1207 (1999).

Instead, the party opposing summary judgment must respond to the motion with specific facts
showing there is a general issue for trial. Id.; see also Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(e) ("[A]n adverse
party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's pleadings, but the party's
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing

36

R., pp. 270-271, and 327
9

that there is a genuine issue for trial."). A mere scintilla of evidence or only a slight doubt as to
the facts is insufficient to withstand summary judgment. Corbridge v. Clark Equip. Co., 112
Idaho 85, 87, 730 P.2d 1005, 1007 (1986). Where the evidence reveals no disputed issues of
material fact, then only a question of law remains, the Supreme Court exercises free review.

JBM, LLC v. Cintorino, 159 Idaho 772, 367 P.3d 167, 170 (2016) (citations omitted).
V.ARGUMENT
Idaho is a Race-Notice State

1.

Idaho is a race-notice state as set forth in Idaho Code §55-812, which states:
Every conveyance of real property other than a lease for a term not exceeding one
(1) year, is void as against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee of the same
property, or any part thereof, in good faith and for a valuable consideration,
whose conveyance is first duly recorded.
Recording statutes exist to provide a place and method for a would-be purchaser to
determine what kind of title he or she is obtaining. Farm Bureau Fin. Co. v. Carney, 100 Idaho
745, 749, 605 P.2d 509, 513 (1980) 37 . By design, recording statutes compel buyers to record
instruments affecting title, for the ultimate purpose of permitting subsequent purchasers to rely
upon the record title. Kalange v. Rencher, 136 Idaho 192, 196, 30 P.3d 970, 974 (2001) 38 • In
addition to giving notice to others that an interest is claimed in real property, the recording
statutes protect against bona fide third parties who may be dealing in the same property. Id39 .

37

R., pp. 498-499

Id.
39 Id.
38

10

In a pure-race jurisdiction, a purchaser for value who records first-with or without actual
or constructive notice of a prior unrecorded conveyance-takes priority. Dep't ofTransp. v.

Humphries, 496 S.E.2d 563, 566 (N.C. 1998)40 . In a race-notice jurisdiction like Idaho, recorded
interests are effective against unrecorded interests when the recorded interest is taken for a
valuable consideration and in good faith-i.e., without knowledge, either actual or constructive,
that unrecorded interests exist. Froman v. Madden, 13 Idaho 138, 88 P. 894 (1907) 41 .
A buyer with notice of inconsistent claims does not take in good faith, and one who fails
to investigate the obvious inconsistent claim cannot take in good faith. Langroise v. Becker, 96
Idaho 218, 220, 526 P .2d 178, 180 (1974) 42 . A buyer cannot be a good faith purchaser when a
reasonable investigation of the property would have revealed the existence of the conflicting
claim in question. Id. at 221 43 . One buying property occupied by a third party is put on notice of
any adverse claim or right of possession by such third party, which a reasonable investigation
would reveal. Paurley v. Harris, 75 Idaho 112, 117, 268 P.2d 351, 353 (1954) 44 . The prevailing
view is that Idaho's Legislature did not intend to allow a buyer with actual knowledge of an
adverse claim or possession to eliminate all rights inconsistent with those in his deed merely by
recording. Langroise, 96 Idaho at 22045 .
Defendants acknowledge they are not bona fide purchasers46 and, thus, rely solely upon
the "shelter rule" to support their assertion that they acquired their properties, as applicable, free
and clear of NHD's ownership in the 33-Foot Strip of land.

Id.
Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
4s Id.
46
R., p. 496
40

41

11

2.

Burden of Proof
In order to claim the protection of being a bona fide purchaser, a party "must show that at

the time of the purchase he paid a valuable consideration and upon the belief and the validity of
the vendor's claim of title without notice, actual or constructive, of any outstanding adverse
rights of another." Weitz v. Green, 148 Idaho 851, 858-59, 230 P.3d 743, 750-51 (2010) citing
Imig v. McDonald, 77 Idaho 314,318,291 P.2d 852,855 (1955). 47

3.

The Shelter Rule
The "Shelter Rule" was adopted by the Idaho Court of Appeals in the case of Sun Valley

Land and Minerals, Inc. v. Burt, 123 Idaho 862, 868, 853 P.2d 607,613 (1993), which states:

The "Shelter Rule" provides that one who is not a bona fide purchaser, but who takes an
interest in property from a bona fide purchaser, may be sheltered in the latter's protective
status. This rule is established in many jurisdictions. See 77 AM.JUR.2d Vendor and
Purchaser§ 718 (1975); ANNOT., Right of One Who, with Knowledge of Outstanding
Equity, Derived His Interest to Real Property From or Through a Bona Fide Purchaser,
to same Protection as Latter, 63 A.LR. 1362 (1929). However, it has not been

articulated in Idaho. Idaho Code§ 55-606, describing a bona fide purchaser, was adopted
from a nearly identical section of the California Civil code, therefore it is presumed to
carry the construction given by the jurisdiction from which the statute was taken. Siegel
Mobile Home Group, Inc. v. Bowen, 114 Idaho 531, 757 P.2d 1250 (Ct.App.1988) citing
Johnson v. Casper, 75 Idaho 256,270 P.2d 1012 (1954). When construing their own

statute, the California courts have established that a bona fide purchaser can transfer good

47

R., p. 500
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title to a person who has notice of a prior adverse equity or right. Jones v. Independent

Title Co.,23 Cal.2d 859, 147 P.2d 542 (1944); Rose v. Knapp, 153 Cal.App.2d 379, 314
P.2d 812 (1957). See also WW Planning, Inc. v. Clark, 10 Ariz. App. 86,456 P.2d 406
(1969).
There are two exceptions to the rule: (1) where the interest held by a bona fide purchaser
was obtained from a grantor with notice of an outstanding interest in the property, and the
property is reconveyed to the grantor; and (2) when the property is reconveyed from a
bona fide purchaser to a person guilty of a violation of a trust or duty with respect to the
property. 77 AM.JUR.2d Vendor and Purchaser§§ 720, 721. The exceptions do not
apply in this case. Therefore, Sun Valley is entitled to take the property, even if it knew
ofDCI's adverse claims, because it is cloaked in First Federal's status as a bona fide
purchaser.
For the "shelter rule" to apply, Defendants must prove that one of the prior owners of the Knight
Deed Property and Dominguez Deed Property were bona fide purchasers. As previously stated,
none of the Defendants submitted such proofl 8•

4.

Actual or Constructive Notice-Duty to Investigate and Inquire
The Idaho Supreme Court has consistently held that possession by a person other than the

grantee of record is constructive notice to the world. In Kalange v. Rencher, the court
specifically stated:
We have held that possession by other than the grantee of record is constructive
notice to a subsequent purchaser of the claim of the person in possession. Fajen

48

Some of the Defendants assert the court refused to apply the "shelter rule". This is not correct. The trial court
applied the "shelter rule" but correctly found the Defendants submitted no evidence that any prior owner was a bona
fide purchaser.
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v. Pow/us, 96 Idaho 625, 533 P.2d 746 (1975). We have also held that actual
knowledge of a prior encumbrance by a subsequent purchaser or mortgagee
renders his interest inferior to that encumbrance though not recorded. Treasure

Valley Bank v. Butcher, 117 Idaho 974 793 P.2d 206 (1990); Farm Bureau Fin.
Co., Inc. v. Carney, 100 Idaho 745, 605 P.2d 509 (1980).
136 Idaho 192, 196, 30 P.3d 970, 974 (2001). See also, Paurley v. Harris, 75 Idaho 112, 117118, 268 P.2d 351, 353-54 (1954) ("One buying property in the possession of a third party is put
upon notice of any claim of title or right of possession by such third party, which a reasonable
investigation would reveal."); Langroise v. Becker, 96 Idaho 218, 220-21, 526 P.2d 178, 180-81
(1974) (one cannot be a good faith purchaser or encumbrancer when a reasonable investigation
of the property would have revealed the existence of the conflicting claim in question.); W Wood

Investments, Inc. v. Acord, 141 Idaho 75, 86, 106 P.3d 401, 412 (2005) ("One who purchases or
encumbrances with notice of inconsistent claims does not take in good faith, and one who fails to
investigate the open and obvious inconsistent claim cannot take in good faith." Citing

MiddlekauffIL 110 Idaho at 916, 719 P.2d at 1176 (quoting Langroise v. Becker, 96 Idaho 218,
220, 526 P.2d 178, 180 (1974)).
Defendants did not satisfy their burden of proof. 49 W. Orchard Ave. existed since prior to
1921 50 and the prior owners of the Knight Deed Property and Dominguez Deed Property all had
notice that NHD had possession of a portion of the Knight Deed Property and Dominguez Deed
Property and so had a duty to investigate and inquire. Defendants have not submitted any
evidence as to whether the prior owners actually knew about the Deed of Right-of-Way or

49

R. p., 500

so R., p. 327
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whether they inquired or investigated about the ownership interest asserted by NHD. Thus, the
court has no evidentiary basis to decree such prior owners are bona fide purchasers, and,
accordingly, the "shelter rule" is not applicable.
5.

Highways are a Minimum of 50-feet wide
Because there is no evidentiary record as to what the prior owners did or did not know

and as to what inquiry or investigation the prior owners did or did not make, Defendants next
assert prior owners would only have been on notice as to an eleven ( 11) foot width (the south
half) paved portion ofW. Orchard Avenue. This argument fails pursuant to Idaho law.
Idaho Code §40-2312 entitled "Width of Highways" and its predecessor statutes51 set
forth that public highways shall have a minimum width of 50 feet unless (i) otherwise set forth in
the plat, dedication, deed, other document, etc., or (ii) a bridge, alley, or in a townsite or city.
Idaho Code §40-2312 states in part:
( 1)

Where the width of a highway is stated in the plat, dedication, deed, easement,

agreement, official road book, determination or other document or by an oral agreement
supported by clear and convincing evidence that effectively conveys, creates,
recognizes or modifies the highway or establishes the width, that width shall control.
(2) Where no width is established as provided for in subsection ( 1) of this section and
where subsection (3) of this section is not applicable, such highways, except bridges
and those located within cities 52 , shall be not less than fifty (50) feet wide ....

51

Rev. Stat. ofldaho §932 (1887), I.C. § 39-601 (1933), and I.C. §40-701 (1966) (the statutory language changed
slightly with each renumbering of the statutes)
52
The Nampa HD acknowledges there is no specific testimony in the record that the Knight Deed Property and
Dominguez Deed Property are not within city or townsite limits, but Defendants have the burden of proof and no
evidence has been submitted by Defendants
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This minimum width of highways is further supported by Idaho Code§40-109(5) 53 and Idaho
Code §40-605 54 •
The Court in Sopatyk v. Lemhi City, 151 Idaho 809,817,264 P.3d 916, 924 (2011)
acknowledged the legislative intent as to this minimum 50-foot width for public highways, and
stated:
From 1887 forward, the Legislature mandated: "All highways, except alleys and bridges,
must be at least fifty feet wide except those now existing of a less width." Rev. Stat. of
Idaho § 932 (1887). This 1887 statute is the progenitor of today's LC. § 40-2312, which
similarly states: "All highways, except bridges and those located within cities, shall be
not less than fifty (50) feet wide, except those of a lesser width presently existing."
Therefore, all highways are fifty feet wide unless a lesser width is established. Neither
side presented any evidence establishing the road's width. As discussed in Part V.A, ACR
was likely seventy-five feet wide in 1881. Therefore, the Board did not exceed its
statutory authority to validate Anderson Creek Road at fifty-feet wide.
The court in Meservey vs. Gulliford, 14 Idaho 133, 93 P. 780, 785 (1908), substantiated
the reasoning for this minimum 50-foot width, stating:
And, where the right is so acquired, such width must be determined from a consideration
of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. However, it must be borne in mind
that the statute fixes the width of highways at not less than 50 feet, and common

53

"Highways" mean roads, streets, alleys and bridges laid out or established for the public or dedicated or
abandoned to the public. Highways shall include necessary culverts, sluices, drains, ditches, waterways,
embankments, retaining walls, bridges, tunnels, grade separation structures, roadside improvements, adjacent lands
or interests lawfully acquired, pedestrian facilities, and any other structures, works or fixtures incidental to the
preservation or improvement of the highways.
54
Commissioners may lay out new highways within the county as they determine to be necessary. The right-of-way
of any highway shall not be less than fifty (50) feet wide, except in exceptional cases ....
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experience shows that width no more than sufficient for the proper keeping up and repair
of roads generally.
The court in Halverson vs. N Latah Highway District, 151 Idaho 196, 207, 254 P.3d 497,

508 (2011), further affirmed the ruling in Meservey vs. Gulliford, supra, and held:
More recently, the Court reaffirmed the finding in Meservey that the 50-foot width was
"no more than sufficient for the proper keeping up and repair of roads generally." 55
Defendants' assertion that they were only on notice that NHD asserted an interest in
eleven (11) paved feet ofW. Orchard Ave. 56 is belied by Idaho law. To the contrary, Idaho law
provides that the width ofW. Orchard Ave. is a minimum of 50 feet and width, gravel shoulders,
barrow pits, storm drainage water ditches, etc. Defendants' assertion that they only had
constructive notice of an eleven ( 11 )-foot paved surface lacks merit.

6.

The Deed of Right-of-Way conveyed Fee Simple Title
NHD in its motion for summary judgment requested the court decree whether the Deed

of Right-of-Way conveyed to NHD fee simple title to the 33-Foot Strip ofland or some lesser
title 57 • The Honorable George A. Southworth addressed this issue in his Order on Motions for
Summary Judgment, and stated:
Although some courts vary as to the interpretation of deeds purporting to convey land
referencing a "right-of-way," where the deed does not contain language about its purpose
or otherwise limiting the conveyance and conveys a definite parcel of land, courts

55

Bente! vs. Bannock County, 104 Idaho 130, 133, 656 P.2d 1383, 1386 (1983) (quoting Mersevey, 14 Idaho at 148,
93 P. at 785)
56
Defendants have cited to the court three cases, all of which are distinguishable. First, Kaupp v. City of Hailey, 110
Idaho 337, 340-41, 715 P.2d 1007, 1010-11 (Ct. App. 1986)(case involved underground sewer pipes not visible
upon inspection with only a manhole visible from the surface); State v. Anderson, 241 Ind. 184, 191-192, 170 N .E.
2d 812, 815-16 (1960)(Buyer was on constructive notice of the public right-of-way and investigated and made
inquiries to become a BFP); and State ofIndiana v. Cinko, 155 Ind. App. 357,358,292 N.E. 2d 847, 848
(1973)(Court relied upon the State v. Anderson decision, supra)
57
R., pp. 148 and 351
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consistently hold that the deed will be construed to convey fee simple title. C & G, Inc. v.

Rule, 135 Idaho 763, 767, 25 P.3d 76, 80 (2001).
"On one hand 'right-of-way' can mean to qualify or limit the interest granted in a deed to
the right to pass over a tract ofland (an easement)." Id. (quoting Brown v. State, 130
Wash. 2d 430, 436, 924 P.2d 908, 914 (1996)). On the other, the phrase can describe the
parcel of land being conveyed for the purpose of constructing its road. Id.
Again, the Deed is unambiguous:
Now, Therefore, in consideration of the location and establishment of said public
highway as above described and the benefits to accrue to us ... we do hereby
grant and dedicate so much of the lands owned and claimed by us and each of us
as aforesaid lying within the boundaries of said strip to the public and to said
Nampa Highway District, Canyon County, Idaho, for use as a public highway ...
Here, there is no language in the Deed that limits the use of the property, or indicates that
the Luptons intended any type of reversionary interest such as a right of re-entry or
possibility ofreverted. The Deed expressly "grant[s] and dedicate[s]" the 33-foot strip
from the centerline "to the public" and "for use as a public highway." The term "right-ofway" in this Deed merely describes the land generally, and does not serve to limit or
restrict the land to an easement. 58
NHD agrees with the Honorable George A. Southworth's analysis and conclusion. First,
Defendants did not address or brief this issue with the trial court despite NHD having included
the issue in its motion for summary judgment and memorandum in support. Thus, the issue was

58

R., p. 502
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not preserved by the Defendants for appeal and is deemed waived. 59 Second, Defendants' notices
of appeal do not specifically list this issue. Third, Defendants rely upon the decision in Neider v.

Shaw60 for their assertion that the Deed of Right-of-Way conveyed an easement instead of fee
simple title, but this case is distinguishable. The Deed of Right-of-Way 61 does not limit the
conveyance to a grant of a right-of-way, but rather grants and dedicates the 33-Foot Strip for use
as a public highway. Neider focused on the actual conveyance language that limited the grant to
only a "right-of-way" to the Railroad. The Deed of Right-of-Way does not contain this
limitation. NHD respectfully asserts the Honorable Judge Southworth correctly analyzed and
decided the issue and his decision should be affirmed.

VI. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, NHD respectfully requests that the Court uphold the decision of
the district court granting summary judgment in NHD's favor. NHD further requests that the
court award NHD attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-117, § 12-121, and
I.R.C.P 54.

DATED this 2l8t day of October, 2019.
Jones ♦ Williams ♦ Fuhrman ♦

Gourley, P.A.

/s/ Kimbell D. Gourley
Kimbell D. Gourley

59

State v. Gonzalez, 165 Idaho 95,439 P.3d 1267, 1271 (2019), reh'g denied (May 17, 2019); Barmore vs. Perrone,
145 Idaho 340, 343, 179 P.3d 303, 306 (2008)(the longstanding rule of this court is that we will not consider issues
that are raised for the first time on appeal); Trunnel v. Ferge!, 153 Idaho 68, 71, 278 P.3d 938, 941 (2012)(1ssues not
raised below but raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered or reviewed- cites omitted)
60
138 Idaho 503, 507, 65 P.3d 525, 529 (2003)
61
R., pp. 279-280
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